Abstract-Data about terrorist networks is sparse and not consistently tagged as desired for research. Moreover, such data collections are hard to come across, which makes it challenging to propose solutions for the dynamic phenomenon driving these networks. This creates the need for generative network models based on the existing data.
I. INTRODUCTION, MOTIVATION, AND PROBLEM
DEFINITIONS This research explores the creation of synthetic terrorist networks as a mechanism of generating more networks similar to existing public data that we found and considered. Data about these networks is sparse and hard to find. These networks actively work to conceal their relationships from outsiders and insiders [1] . We cannot simply crawl the web to create a terrorist network as can be done for technological or social ones for example.
For an understanding of terrorist networks, multiple data sets would be required to allow analysts to perform tests and draw conclusions. Unfortunately, such data is not readily available, rather we foun just a few sets are publicly available for research [2] , [3] , [4] . Based on the data found, three multilayered networks were introduced and their community structure was studied in [5] . We propose to further understand the structure of these networks' layers to create a basic model that can be used for further research, with appropriate augmentation based on the focus of the analysis to be performed. A better understanding of terrorism, cartels, and general enemy combatants will enhance the creation of the proposed terrorist networks, as an example of dark networks [6] .
We take into account several topological measures to determine members' affiliations, as well as, interactions between sub-groups called communities. Our methodology is based on the properties we observed in the three available data sets, and it is not meant to be comprehensive, due to lack of data to validate it on.
Building on the previous analysis used in [5] , the current research augments the understanding of these layers, and introduces a methodology to generate synthetic networks with the observed properties. The additional layer analysis performed that we capture in this paper includes the following properties (1) the number of components, (2) the degree distributions, (3) the correlation of number of triads and degree for each node, (4) the average neighbor degree versus the degree for each node, (5) the sizes of the communities, and (6) the k-core.
Using these properties, each layer in each network is analyzed and used in creating the methodology to generate a synthetic version for each layer. We then validate our methodology for synthetic layer creation, against the real layers of the given data, using the same metrics above.
II. RELATED WORK
The data for our research is based on three publicly available terrorist networks: Noordin Top, Boko Haram, and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) [5] .
The Noordin Top network, created from a data set containing 14 different relationship types amongst 139 terrorists for a total of 1499 edges, from [4] . It captures the relationships of five major terrorist organizations that operate in Indonesia. Noordin Top is the key broker between these organizations conducting large scale terrorist training and operations.
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The Boko Haram network was created based on the data [2] , and it is the aggregation of 9 different relationship types amongst 105 terrorists for a total of 73 edges. This network captures the relationships of an Islamic extremist organization that primarily operates in Nigeria.
The FARC network was created using [3] , as the aggregation of 10 different relationship types amongst 142 terrorists with 1527 edges. This network illustrates the relationships of the FARC terrorist organization that operates in Colombia.
For each of these three networks, these multiple relationships were categorized into three layers for a meaningful examination of these relationships as multilayered networks [5] . The three layers are Trust, Lines of Communication (LOC), and Knowledge, consistent for all three networks. Each layer encompasses three or more relationships and/or social interactions. The data was scaled intentionally to support easier but relevant analysis while preserving the richness of the relationship data [5] . The added benefit of the combinations of layers was analyzed in [7] .
These terrorist networks are different than standard social networks [8] , as they are inherently incomplete, hidden and purposely misleading. For a better understanding of these networks, the reader can see the approach to identify communities of interest and purpose driven communities within these dark networks [9] , [10] . Related, but a bit different, the identification of people of interest, rather than communities of interest was studied in [11] . The same data was also used for network comparison through sampling in [12] , [13] .
Since the introduction of multilayered networks [14] , [15] , several generative models have been introduced, with a review up to 2014 in [16] . The general trends are in growing multiplex network models generally based on preferential attachment [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] , simple statistic models [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] , [26] , and ensembles of multilayered networks [27] , [28] , [29] , [30] such as multilayered exponential random graphs [31] . In the current work, we focus on multiple layers as well as meso-scale properties like core-periphery and community structure. The paper [32] proposes generating models for unweighted and weighted networks having both meso-scale structures. Domenico et al. take a detailed look at centrality, clustering coefficients, modularity, von Neumann entropy, and diffusion in multilayered networks [14] . These parameters are used to make generalizations about networks and understand the influence of nodes that are deemed important.
III. TERRORIST NETWORK ANALYSIS
This section will augment the analysis presented in [5] of the layers of the three terrorist networks. The scope of this study is to analyze these layers to build a generative model, through seeking an understanding of centrality and community results.
We aim to determine characteristics indicative of terrorist networks in an effort to have a model terrorist networks at different scales. We observe that there are two types of layers in the three networks. The first type is the evolving layer, which is very sparse and disconnected representing either a layer that still evolves or a layer with little data captured, as seen in Figure 1 (The nodes of degree zero are not included in Figure 1 ).
Fig. 1: An evolving layer (colored by communities)
The second type is the mature layer that is denser and shows a nice community and core structure, as seen in Figure 2 . It has a large connected component, and sometimes a few nodes of degree zero in the layer. Some nodes have degree zero in one layer, but they will have nonzero degree in other layers of the network. We now analyze the following properties of terrorist layers (Trust, LOC, and Knowledge) to understand the structural organization of the layer and what sets it apart from the standard studied networks.
A. Connected Components
We observe that the mature layers have fewer components than the evolving layers as shown in Table I . (5) 88 (4) The large number of disconnected trivial components in the evolving layers show that there are many degree zero nodes, and therefore we will focus on the nontrivial components.
For the mature layers, the nodes that are in separate components in one layer, are in the same component in other layers. This depends on the types of relationships that connect the nodes, allowing the network to work cohesively while purposely hiding the unnecessary connections.
B. Degree Distribution
It is well known that most real world networks follow power law or exponential degree distribution [33] . But in the current terrorist layers, the nodes try to hide the information of their structural location and influential power. We analyze the degree distribution of all mature layers for the considered datasets. The results are shown in Figure 9 , which for ease of comparing the synthetic to the real layers are displayed in Section V.
The degree distribution of these layers are not easily matched by fitting a curve as they do not follow a proper distribution characteristic. For example for the Noordin's Knowledge layer is a Weibull Distribution as shown in Figure 3 . However, to keep it consistent with the existing distributions in the literature of network science (and consistent within the mature layers), we picked the best exponential degree distribution, and use it for our methodology of mature layers. For the evolving layers, we used the nontrivial degree sequence in order to capture the topology of the layer, and not skew our results by the values of the degree zero nodes.
C. Number of Triangles versus Degree
We further analyze how nodes make connections in these kinds of dark networks. We plot the number of triangles versus the degree of each node in each layer. We find that these are linearly correlated, as shown in Figure 4 for mature layers, and not so much for evolving ones as seen Figure 8 (a). Thus the higher degree nodes have higher clustering coefficients, unlike the observed correlations in the existing literature on complex networks [34] . Next, we study the correlation of degree and the average neighbor degree, shown in Figure 5 , each color representing a different layer. This shows that the nodes display random adjacency in the effort of keeping the network covert. These layers are neither assortative nor disassortative. The assortativity coefficient [35] for the layers of all three networks are shown in Tables III, IV and V, for an ease of comparing the synthetic layers to the true ones.
E. Community Sizes
We further study, how the sizes of communities vary in mature and evolving layers, each color showing a different layer in Figure 6 . The communities are identified by the Louvain method [36] . Notice that they are medium size for the mature layers ( Figure 6 ), while they are composed of just a few nodes for the evolving ones (see FARC's Trust and Knowledge in Figure 6 (b) and all layers in Figure 8 (b) ).
F. Analysis of the k-core
Finally, we would like to consider the k-core evolution [37] . The evolving layers don't have a core, as they take different forms of relaxed cliques. Thus, we consider the core of mature layers, and show how communities attach to the core. For each layer, the k-core is the largest subgraph consisting of all the vertices having k or more neighbors in that subgraph. The core size is the largest value of such k, at which point the k-core becomes the core of the layer. The nontrivial graph given by the k values for which the k + 1-core vanishes, is the core of the layer. Notice that there are three ways for communities to attach to the core:
• communities attach using a single community node to a single core node (rarely) • communities attach using a few community nodes to one core node
• communities attach using a few community nodes to a few core nodes.
There are a few edges between other communities' nodes as well. Examples of some of these attachment types can be seen in Figure 2 . The core is given by the majority of the green and brown nodes in Figure 2 . The k-core evolution of Noordin's layer is shown in Figure 7 , as an example.
To conclude, we observe two different types of layers: the evolving one and the mature one, and they are structurally different. We are now prepared to introduce our methodology for creating synthetic versions of both types of layers of terrorist networks.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In this section we present our methodology for each of the two types of layers observed in the three studied networks.
A. Methodology for Evolving layers
We noticed that there is no core in evolving layers, but rather there are multiple components, most of which have one nontrivial community. Some layers have one or two components that can be partitioned into a couple of communities. Based on these observations, and the analysis in Section III, we first present a simpler algorithm to account for this layer type. The proposed method is based on the configuration model [38] .
Algorithm 1: Evolving layers Input: Number of nodes (n), degree sequence (ds), number of communities (c), intra-community link probability (p), triad link probability (q) 1) Create a layer with n nodes and assign a degree to each node from the given degree sequence (ds) (degree sequence is the sequence of n degrees placed randomly). If a node is assigned degree d then it will have d open connections. 2) Assign a community number to each node randomly from (1 to c), where c is the total number of communities. 3) In this step, each node will try to make a connection, if it has at least one open connection.
Step is repeated until each node has at least 1 open connection and the connection is feasible based on the current network structure. The type of the connection will be decided using following probabilities: a) The given node will make an intra-community connection with probability p: i) The node will make a triad link with probability q. To make a triad link, the node will randomly choose one of its neighbor's neighbor who belong to the same community and has at least one open connection. ii) The node will be connected to a randomly picked node from the same community with probability (1 − q). b) The given node will be connected to an intercommunity node having at least one open connection with probability (1 − p). As the proposed method is based on the configuration model, so, the rewiring is needed to be done if any node is left with the open connections. In some cases, it is not possible to rewire to link all open connections due to the constraints of community sizes and the probabilities of intracommunity and inter-community links. In these cases, the leftover open connections are discarded.
B. Methodology for Mature layers
The mature layers provide different insight into their structure compared to the evolving layer. We present explanations for our algorithm immediately after we present the algorithm itself. We built the synthetic layers in the following manner:
Algorithm 2: Mature Layer Creation Input: Number of nodes (n), degree distribution (distr), number of edges (m), layer's core (c core as a percent of n).
1) Instantiate an empty layer with n nodes and place them in the set V (G). Assign a degree desired degree i to each node, sampled from the given distr. for community i to attach to. Choose these nodes to be the ones with largest desired degree i − established degree i c) Attach the α leaders to the α nodes in G j based on random probabilities of the possible attachment. d) Assign leftover edges randomly to existing nodes that don't have the desired degree chosen from the degree distribution. We build the algorithm based on the following four properties and we present explanations on how and why propose them as such:
Degree Distribution: We sample degrees from the degree distribution curve of the original layer. While there is no structure to the created synthetic layer thus far, we are able to ensure all persons in the layer are represented with the appropriate approximate number or potential relationships.
Core size: Let G 0 be the subgraph we create that models the k-core as a percent of the whole layer. It is a clique on the given c core number of vertices. Each layer represents a different percentage of nodes represent in the core: for our analysis we used the percents as depicted in the Noordin Layer Trust c core = 9.35%, Noordin's LOC layer c core = 7.19%, and Noordin's Knowledge layer c core = 17.99%. The degrees of the nodes in G 0 are not yet achieved, in order to allow the nodes outside of G 0 to attach to them to produce Number of communities: We can then find the community count by dividing the nodes outside of the core into equal size communities to begin with: community count = n−c synthetic . Notice that while the community size is instantiated at = 20, the size of some communities will increase in size, and some will decrease based on the attachment of edges between the nodes in the communities. As we add community j to G j−1 (with G 0 being the established core), we will create a sequence of graphs G j (0 ≤ j ≤ community count), where G community count will be our final synthetic layer. Nodes with the top α highest degree (1 ≤ α ≤ 3) in each community of nodes (again, we used = 20) are earmarked as hubs for each community. Each α is picked at random for each community, allowing a diverse way of connecting. Clustering coefficient and number of triad links through the edges between G 0 and the rest of the nodes: Once G 0 is formed, the nodes earmarked as hubs are again examined and the nodes with the highest degree that are not in G 0 are pulled to become leaders. Once the core is established, all communities are subsequently established with preference for closing triangles. Communities are connected to the graph one by one. The first community will connect to the core by attaching to the node of highest degree in G 0 . The resulting graph is G 1 . Communities attach to G j in random order, through adjacencies to the nodes in highest need to fulfill their degree in order to achieve the degree sampled from the degree distribution curve. Communities attach through α community nodes identified already, in order to account for some communities that connect just through a node, while other connect through 2 or 3 to the existing graph.
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section we present the results obtained using our methodology. We then compare the synthetic layers created using some metrics from our real data, such as the degree distribution, to the real layers. We first present distributions on randomly sampled layers as examples, and we follow with tables presenting metrics over 20 runs.
We start with the comparison of the Degree Distributions, by sampling one example of each type of mature layers. Figure 9 shows the Noordin and Synthetic Degree Distributions with their respective distribution parameter(s).
Similarly, we sample one layer for each of Noordin and FARC, and the results for the number of triangles as a function of the degree are shown in Figure 10 . Notice that we follow the same trend as in the original layers.
Similarly, to asses the success of the synthetic layer creation methodology, we compare the synthetic k-core of each layer to the original k-core. The results in Table II show comparable values for the k-core size. Next, we follow with Tables III, IV , and V to present a comparisons of standard characteristics for each layer, averaged over 20 samples: Notice that the metrics of the synthetic layers are comparable with the ones for the real layers. While rarely we overestimate, most of our results underestimate the metrics of the real networks. Even though the assortativity coefficients are neutral (so no assortativity nor dis-assortativity is present), we stay within the range and generally match the Since no identity was assigned to the nodes while creating the synthetic network, we cannot consider an analysis of a monoplex built from these layers.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER DIRECTIONS
In this project, we introduce a methodology for synthetic networks based on three public terrorist data sets: Noordin Top, Boko Haram, and FARC. Multilayered networks were created from these three attributed enriched terrorist datasetsin [5] . We performed a deeper analysis of the three multilayered networks and propose synthetic model based on our analysis.
We build our work on the analysis of just three datasets, which has its limitations. We observe that there are two types of layer topology: evolving layers (tree like, with several stars type topology) and mature layers (a more advance structure, that differs from the expected typologies notices in the network science literature).
Based on our analysis of three data sets, we thus introduce generative models for both evolving as well as matured layers, code for both layers is poster on GitHub [39] . This model can be enhanced through a better understating of the topology of terrorist networks from more data. We noticed that the expected degree distributions and the low clustering for high degree nodes are not present in these networks.
The developed methodology described in this paper was successful in creating synthetic versions of the real layer's structure. By comparing layer characteristics and degree distributions of each layer's synthetic counter-part to the real terrorist networks of [5] , we see that our methodology performs very well in most metrics, with Average Clustering Coefficient being the one needing additional work.
For a future more accurate representation, it is desired to choose additional network characteristics to include in the analysis and comparison. However, an awareness of overfitting should be kept in mind, as currently there are just three datasets to base the construction on. For example, fitting distributions to network characteristics other than degree distribution would be helpful.
Our work is based on the creation of three multilayered terrorist networks, each layer being the aggregation of several relationships. This method could be adapted and generalized to building synthetic versions for multilayered networks with more than 3 layers, such a one layer for each relationship described in the original data, or other choices.
Attaching terrorists' name to nodes as the layer is created maintains information integrity across layers to form the multilayered network itself. A possible starting point would be to assign names in accordance with degrees. Hence, the highest degree in the synthetic network would be given the name of the terrorist with the highest degree in the original network. However, this assumes you have information about the terrorists.
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